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Abstract 
The validation of data from sensors has be­
come an important issue in the operation and 
control of modern industrial plants. One ap­
proach is to use know ledge based techniques 
to detect inconsistencies in measured data. 
This article presents a probabilistic model for 
the detection of such inconsistencies. Based 
on probability propagation, this method is 
able to find the existence of a possible fault 
among the set of sensors. That is, if an er­
ror exists, many sensors present an apparent 
fault due to the propagation from the sen:. 
sor(s) with a real fault. So the fault detection 
mechanism can only tell if a sensor has a po ­
tentwl fault, but it can not tell if the fault is 
real or apparent. So the central problem is to 
develop a theory, and then an algorithm, for 
distinguishing real and apparent faults, given 
that one or more sensors can fail at the same 
time. This article then, presents an approach 
based on two levels: (i) probabilistic reason­
ing, to detect a potential fault, and (ii) con­
straint management, to distinguish the real 
fault from the apparent. ones. The proposed 
approach is exemplified by applying it to a 
power plant model. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Computing is playing an increasingly important role in 
domains like communications, medicine, and industry. 
Examples of industrial applications include the control 
of advanced manufacturing plants, power generation, 
power distribution, and chemical processes. These ap­
plications require the utilization of several method­
ologies that have emerged from the area of artificial 
intelligence (AI). In general, AI methods are moving 
towards more realistic domains that require coopera­
tion between several fields of research. This paper de­
scribes an ongoing research project in the utilization 
of AI methods to solve the problem of sensor valida­
tion. Although the techniques presented here can be 
considered as general, the specific application is in the 
power plants domain. 
The approach proposed in this paper has two layers: 
• a prediction layer: which is used to predict the ex­
pected values of the sensors and identify potential 
faults; 
• a constraint satisfaction layer: which is used to 
distinguish the faulty sensor(s) from the appar­
ently faulty ones. 
Both layers make use of a probabilistic network model. 
A probabilistic or Bayesian network [Pearl, 1988] is a 
directed acyclic graph (DAG) whose structure corre­
sponds to the dependency relations of the set of vari­
ables represented in the network (nodes), and which is 
parameterized by the conditional probabilities (links) 
required to specify the underlying distribution. In this 
case, the nodes correspond to the sensors that consti­
tute the model. The structure of the network makes 
explicit the dependence and independence relations 
between the variables. 
In this approach, with the use of probability propaga­
tion, a prediction is made of a variable's value based 
on other parameters. If this predicated value devi­
ates from the actual value given by a sensor, by some 
predefined margin, then some fault can be assumed. 
But the fault detection mechanism can only tell if a 
sensor has a potential fault, but it can not tell if the 
fault is real or apparent. The central problem is to de­
velop a theory, and then an algorithm, for distinguish­
ing real and apparent faults, considering that one or 
more sensors can fail at the same time. For this, the 
structure of the model is considered, which produces 
a set of constraints that has to be solved to determine 
the faulty sensor( s). This article then, presents an ap­
proach based in two levels: (i) probability propagation, 
to detect a potential fault, and (ii) constraint manage­
ment, to distinguish the real faulty from the apparent 
ones. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 in­
troduces the problem and summarizes previous ap­
proaches. Section :3 presents the approach with the 
aid of a simple example. Section 4 presents the ideas 
formally. Section 5 describes a real example that shows 
the complete technique. Finally, section 6 presents the 
conclusions and future work. 
2 SENSOR VALIDATION 
The validation of data from sensors has become an 
important issue in the operation and control of modern 
industrial plants. Usually, the control system can not 
detect significant deviations from the expected values 
given the design working point, for example of the gas 
turbine in a power plant. Conversely, an experienced 
operator is capable of detecting such deviations of a 
variable by direct observation of the related variables 
and consequently, avoids false plant trips. This project 
proposes the modelling of the operator's experience in 
the detection of sensor failures . 
Typical solutions to this problem, particularly in criti­
cal systems where security is essential, include the use 
of: 
• Hardware redundancy and majority voting: where 
hardware is duplicated and a voting algorithm is 
used to exclude faulty sensors. This is possible in 
applications such as civilian aircraft or part of the 
nuclear industry [Yung and Clarke , 1989]. How­
ever , for many industrial plants , these techniques 
are not feasible where , for example , adding fur­
ther sensors might we aken the walls of the pres­
sure vessels. 
• Analytical redundancy: in which all process, actu­
ators and sensors are monitored centrally . Exam­
ples of these techniques are generalized likelihood 
ratio (GLR) [Willsky and Jones, 1976], and failure 
sensitwe filters [Massoumnia, 1986]. 
However , these approaches can require the develop­
ment of mathematical or knowledge based models 
whose solution require expensive computer power. Ad­
ditionally, they are very expensive and demand an 
enormous amount of expertise to use them in a differ­
ent process or even make a modification of the mon­
itored system. Modern techniques, from where this 
project is motivated , include a decentralised and hier­
archical approach [Yung and Clarke, 1989]. A survey 
of some of these techniques can be found in [Basseville, 
1988]. 
Previous stages in the development of this project in­
cluded some experiments in the validation of signals 
in power plants [Ibargiiengoytia et al., 1995]. These 
experiments were based on the following assumption: 
each sensor is validated independently , i.e., each vari­
able was considered as the hypothesis while some other 
variables were considered as correct evidence. How­
ever , a real solution of the problem requires a different 
set of assumptions to be taken. For example, if the 
turbine velocity is validated utilizing only the signals 
of temperature and pressure, and if the re asoning re-
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ports a faulty sensor, it is impossible to define which 
sensor was the faulty one. In this example, if the tern­
perature sensor fails and it is utilized to detect a fault 
in the velocity, the system will certainly report a fail­
ure on the velocity reading. This could be a wrong 
conclusion . 
Such an approach , of course , requires the help of do­
main experts to identify the dependencies of the vari­
ables and must also take into account of the following 
characteristics: 
• The sensors can provide erroneous information. 
• Information is available all the time, i .e ., all sen­
sors can be observed as evidence or considered as 
an hypothesis at any time . 
• The system must respond within a real time en­
vironment. 
• The application considers the possibility of mul­
tiple faults . 
3 THE APPROACH PROPOSED 
This section presents the approach proposed through 
a very simple example. Assume the model of the gas 
turbine in a power plant shown in Fig. 11 . The root 
node m represents the reading of the Megawatts gen­
erated in the plant. The temperature is represented 
by node t and the pressure by p. Finally , g represents 
the fuel supplied to the combustion chamber. The val­
idation process starts assuming that the sensors, one 
by one, are suspect. By probabilistic reasoning, the 
system decides if the reading of the sensor is correct 
based on the values of the most related variables. This 
process is carried out for each one of the variables that 
is required to be validated. The most closely related 
Figure l: Simple tree representing the turbine gener­
ation model. 
variables for each sensor consist of the Markov blanket 
of the sensor variable. A Markov blanket is defined as 
the set of variables that make a variable independent 
1This is a simplified model of the gas turbine. The 
directions of the arcs do not imply causality. 
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from the others. In a Bayesian network, the follow­
ing three sets of neighbours is sufficient for forming 
a Markov blanket of a node : the set of direct. prede­
cessors , direct successors, and the direct predecessors 
of the successors (i.e parents, children, and spouses). 
The set of variables that constitutes the Markov blan­
ket of a variable can be seen as a protection of this 
variable against. changes of variables outside the blan­
ket. Tlus rnea.ns that, in order t.o analyze a variable, 
it is only needed to know the value of all variables in 
its blanket. For exarnple, in Fig. l a Markov blanket 
of t is { m, g}, while a blanket of g consists of { t} only. 
Table l shows the Markov blankets of each one of the 
variables in the rnodel of Fig. 1. Considering these 
Table I: Markov blankets of the turbine rnodel. 
process variable Markov blanket 
m {t,p} 
{m,g} 
p {m} 
g { t} 
blankets, probabilistic reasoning is performed utiliz­
ing the reduced rnodels for each variable as shown in 
Fig. 2. In (a), the equivalent rnodel of m is shown 
where the absence of g indicates that this variable is 
out. of m.'s Markov blanket.. ln (b), the model to pre­
dict t indicat.es t.hat thf:' changf:'s of pare not ronsi clf:'red 
giwn a value of m. The sanw for p and gin (c) and 
(d). 
rz r r 7 0 0 9 0 0 
0 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
Figure 2: Equivalf:'nt models for the variables. (a) for 
m, (b) for f. (c) for p, and (d) for y. 
A�sunH' that. the tf:'lnpera.ture sensor suffers catas­
t.roplllr danmge . e.g., thP wires wert> cut.. Starting the 
Validation jli'UfPSS with Ill, Slllrf:' f jJarftcipafCS ill the 
validatiOn [se<' Fig. 2(a)], and due to the fa.ihtrf' Ill t, 
the rPasoning will indicate that. there is a. failure in m. 
Next., thP validation for t will of coursf' indicat.P tlw 
existence of a failurP . Tlw va lidation uf p will incli­
cat.e> that. this ���n,;or is working properly . Finally, t.he 
validation of !f, given tt.s Pquivalent. rnodel shown in 
Fig. 2( d), will abo indic<t.t<:> a failur<:> in the sensor Su. 
even after the probabilistic reasoning, there is still con­
fusion: which are real and which are apparent faults? 
The use of a constraint satisfaction system is required . 
In this case, the presence of a faulty sensor causes a 
constrained area of rnaniff:'st.ation which forms a con­
text. The contexts can be arranged in a lattice as 
shown in Fig. :) . The lower nod!:' represents the no 
fault contf:'xt of t.he systern . The upp!:'r layers repre­
Sf:'nt an incremental assumption of faulty sensors. The 
top node represents a context. where all the Sf:'nsors are 
reported faulty . 
mtpg l 
( mtg I 
:··:-.,_. .. � 
< mt ( tp ) 
.. 1· 
m ) ' p 
( tpg ) 
T 
.± 
tg. ) 
1 
(. g 
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Figure :3: Lattice with the four variables , m, t, p, and 
g, for the model in Fig. 1 .  
Every step in the probabilist.ic rf:'asoning generates a 
constraint. for the final detection of the sensor in fail. 
Starting at the bottom of the lattice of Fig. 3, eac-h step 
will rnake a transition between thf:' nodes of the lattice. 
Figure 4 shows the transitions from thP bottom node 
(cp) to thf:' final node : {m,l,y}. 
g fails 
t fails 
m fails 
Figure 4: Trajectory followed in the lattice by the 
probabilistic reasoner" 
This papPr shows that there exist.� a correspondence 
between a fault in a sensor and the node of the lattice 
obtained when propagating the failures reported by 
the probabilistic reasoning. In this exarnple , when t 
fails. the rorrt>sponcling !attic!:' node is { m, t, y}. This 
uode corresponds to th� set. of variables that fonns the 
Markov blanket. of a variabh' plus tlw variable itself. 
Tablt> :l :sl!ow,; tlw Markov blankets and the lattice's 
nodt' cont>spmHling to t.llt' constrctints propagation for 
t'ach variable> in fanlt. Tht'u. if a propagation on the 
lattice finishes in { m, t, p} it signifies that the fault. is 
in sensor m. Lattice node { m, p} corresponds to p, 
and finally, { l. !I} corresponds to y. 
Table 2: Markov blankets of tht> simple turbine m odel . 
proct>:s� variable Markov blanket lattice node 
m {t,p} {m,t,p} 
{in,g} {m,t,g} 
p {m} {m,p} 
!I {t} {t,g} 
With this llH'chani:ml, even if there exist rnany appar­
ent faults. t.he propagation on t.ht> lattice distinguishes 
which setJsor wnt.ains t.ht> real fault.. Table 2 consid­
ers only single f<wlts. However, thf' method assures 
that if tlw latt.irf' propagation finislws in a node not 
inrluded in Table 2, it. signifif's that. tiH're exist.;; mor" 
than one sensor with a fault. Section 4 explains and 
demonstrat.f's t.hf'st-• JllPChanisrHs. 
4 A THEORY FOR SENSOR 
VALIDATION 
Tlw prob;dJilist.ic: JJ ILHit'J fur ,;ellsur vaJid;d.iuu rurJ:sisC:-; 
of a Bayesian Hf't.work as dt>tint>d by Pearl [Pf'arl. 19H8]. 
That is, a directed ar.ydic graph (; which is a mmimal 
!-map of tlw dt>pend<·ncy nwdel M for a probability 
distribution P. (; is an !-map or mdcprndcncy map of 
M if 
I(S. Z, Y)M �< X I Z I Y >u (l) 
wherf' I(X,Z, Y), X, y·,z art' subsets of V, denot.es 
conditional independt>nce of X and Y given Z, and 
< X I Z / Y >t) rt>present.s a graph (,'where tht' sub­
set. Z of nodPs intercepts all paths betwPen t.he nod.Ps 
of X and thust> of r'. U is an !-map of M if every 
conditiunal indt>pPtHiencf' nmdit.ion (according t.o tht' 
D-sr:pnmliun criteria) di�playf'd in (; rorresporids t.o a 
valid cuudit.iunal indt'peuclenct> rflationship in lvJ. It 
is a 11/.lll.lll/.a/ !-map if uunf' of tt.s lillh rau bt> deiPt.ed 
wit.ltuut dt>struyirtg it:; 1-lll.!lJil!ts.� [F't>Ml. lDt!H]. 
Dt>tiuitiou 1: (;iVPII a pruhahilit.y di�t.rihutiuu P u11 
a. st'l uf variah],·,.; V. aDA(;(;= (1/, E) (I" is a Sf>t. of 
nuciP:>, t_· is a st>l uf link�) is C\. Ba:ljcswn Ndwu·rl.: iff(; 
is a minnnal!-m!lJI of P. 
A Mnrkuv blrwktl. for a.uy node X in a Bayesian net­
work is it suh:-;t>t of V which rnakes it. i n dependen t frorn 
tilE' ut.lwr variahlt>s. 
Definition 2: A M (u·kun (J{anl.:et M H( X) of any vari­
able X E V is <l su hst>l. .'->' C \/ w herf' X rf. S for w hiC"h 
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!(X, S, V- ;,·-X) (2) 
In a Bayesian network , the Markov blanket of a node 
X can be formed by the union of its direct parents 
P A(X), its direct successors .')U(X), and all direct 
parents of the latter S'P(X )  (X's spouses). This fol­
lows from the axioms of rondi tiona! independencl:' and 
t.lw So1mdnc.5.s theorem [Pearl d al., 1990]. Although 
there may b e  other Markov blankets, only this type of 
blankets are considered. 
In using a Bayesian network representation for sensor 
validation, the following assumptions are m ade: 
1. Observability: all the variables (sensors) can be 
measured directly 2. 
2. Fault detection: if there is an error in sensor X it 
can always be detected. That is ;r0 -:j:. Xp, where x0 
is the observed value, and a:P tht> predicted value. 
The predicted value is the one with highest prob­
ability obtained by probability propagation from 
its neighbours, M H(X), assuming X is unknown. 
This is called a real fault denoted by Fr( X). 
;3. Fault propagation: if a sensor Y has a real fault 
Fr(Y), andY EM B(X), a fault in X will be de­
tected, that is a:0 =/= Xp. This is called an apparent 
fault denoted by Frt(X). In general, Y could he 
a set of sensors such that Y C (;. 
If a sew;or (variable} X ha, a rPal fault and/or appar­
ent fault then it is called a potmtial fault Fp(X). Th<> 
fault detection mechanism can only tell if a sensor has 
a p otential fault, but (without considering other sen­
»ors) it can not tell if the fault. is rPal or apparent. So 
the central problem is to dPvelop a theory. and then an 
algorithm , for distinguishing real and apparent faults, 
considering that one or more sensors can fail at the 
same time. 
Lemma 1 (symmetry): Let. X bt-> a node in a 
Bayesian network G with a Markov blanket.:J M H(X), 
X E M  H(Y;) iff Yi EM B(X), 'v'Y; E G. That is, X is 
i11 the Markov blanket of all the variables that are in 
M B(X), and it is only in these Markov blankets. 
Proof: First. the proof that. if Y EM B(X) then X E 
ll1 B(Y). (;iven that M H(X )  = PA(X) u S'U(X) u 
S'P (X), tlm1 Y E PA(X) or Y E SU(X) or Y E 
,<..,'f'(X), so X E Slf(Y) or X E P A(Y) or X E SP(Y), 
respectively. ln any ca.sf'. X E J'vl H(Y). Next, the 
prooft.hat ift' � MB(X) tlwn X rf. MB(Y). By 
Ddinit.ion 2, !(X. /VI B(X). ( ; - M B(X )- X), and by 
thP :-.':ymmdr:q a,nd Drcomposilwn axioms [Pearl d al., 
19DO] /(t';, M B(X), X), \iY; E G- M B(X)-X. Thus 
X is not iu M B(Y).D 
."A one to one correspuudence between nodes, variables, 
and sensors i,; considered. 
'This lemma and the subsequent theorems apply to 
:\1 arkov blankets formed by the direct parents, direct suc­
cessors, and direct parents of the latter. 
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The atcnded Markov blanket EM B(X) is defint->d as 
the union between thf:' Markov blanket of a variable 
and the variable, i.e., EM B(X ) =XU M B(X). 
Theureu1 1: If there is an error in sensor X. it will 
produce a potcntwl fault in X, and all the sensors in 
M B(X), and no other sensor. 
Proof: From assurnption 2, an error in X produces 
a potential fault in X. From Lemma 1, X is an el­
ement of the MB of all sensors Y; E M B(X), so by 
assumption :3, an error in X produces potential faults 
in all sensors in M B(X ). Finally, from Lemma 1 X is 
not an elernent of any other MB, so no other potential 
fault will be detected (assuming X is the only sensor 
in fault.). O 
· 
Corollary 1: Ass uming a single (only one sensor fails} 
real fault. a potwtwl fault in all the sensors in 8 C (; 
implies a real fault in a sensor X such that EM B(X) = 
S, and X E .)'. 
Given that an error in a sensor produees a potential 
fault. in all the sensors in its EMB and only in those, a 
potential fault in all sensors in .'J' implies that a sensor 
in fault has its EM B =,)'(assuming one real fault). 
Corollary 2: If all Markov blankets are different in G, 
M B(Y) =/: M B(Z), V'l, Z E G. Y =/: Z, then all single 
real faults F1·(X) can he distinguished in G. In this 
case only the nodes in EM B(X) will have a potentwl 
fault. 
The validity of Corollary 2 follows from Corollary l 
and the fa('t that all MB are different. 
The problem is that two or more variables could have 
the sarne Markov blanket. Such is the case of leaf 
nodes with the same parent in a tree. 
Corollary 3: If there is an error in sensor X with 
EM B(X), and also an error in Y with EM B(Y), 
they will produce potential fault.s in all nodes Z E 
EM B(X) U Eivf B(Y). ln general, if there are errors 
in sensors X;, i = 1, ... , m, they will produce potential 
faults in all nodes Z E Elvf B(X!} U .. U EM B(Xm) 
Corollary ;) follows clire('tly frorn Theorem l. assurning 
that two or rnore Pnors will not cancel eaeh other (i.e., 
if Z E M B(X) and Z E M B(Y) and both , X and Y 
fail , still a potential fault. will be detected in Z). 
Theorem 2: If there is an error in sensor X with 
EM B(X). and Y E EM B(X) with EM B(Y) C 
EM B(X), and rnultiple faults (more than one sen­
sor can fail sirnultaneously) are considered, then there 
is no distinct ion between Fr·(X) or F1·(X) A F1·(Y) 
Proof: By Theoren1 l, Fr(X) will produce appar­
ent faults in EM B(X). Fr(X) A Fr(Y) will pro­
duce apparent faults in EM B(X) U EM B(Y) by 
Corollary :3 So if EM B(Y) c EM B(X}, t.hen 
EM B(X) u EM B(Y) = EM B(X) so both cases are 
indistinguishable. 0 
Theorem 3: Multiple faults can be distinguished if 
all the extended Markov blankets of tlw SPnsors with 
errors are disjoint. 
Proof: It follows frorn Corollary 2 and :).0 
Theoreu1 4: If the set of nodes :-,·with apparent faults 
in G is different from all EMB(X;), VX, E G, there 
must be multiple (at least 2) real faults in G. The 
sensors X; such EM B(X;) C S' can have real faults, 
an only these sensors. 
Proof: From Theorem 1, a real fault in X produces 
apparent faults in and only in the set of sensors in 
EM B(X). So a single fault can not produce a set S 
of potential faults different from all EM B in C. From 
Corollary ::1, the sensors whose EM B is a subset of S 
can be in fault, and by Theorem 1, only these sensors.O 
Based on the theory clescri bed above, an algorithm is 
required so that, once the model has been established, 
and the Markov and extended Markov blankets have 
been defined, the detec.tion of real failures can be car­
ried out. The proposed algorithm for sensor validation 
is the following: 
1. Obtain the model (i.e., the Bayesian network) of 
the application process. 
2. Make a list of the variables to be validated and 
build a table of EMB for each variable. 
:). Take each one of the variables to be checked as the 
hypothesis, instantiate the variables that form the 
Markov blanket of the hypothesis. and propagate 
the probabilities to obtain the posterior probabil­
ity of the variable given the evidence. 
4. Compare the predicted value (the posterior prob­
ability) with the current value of the variable and 
decide if an error exists. 
5. Repeat steps :3 and 4 until all the variables in the 
list have been examined and the set of sensors 
with apparent faults (.':J') is obtained. 
6. Compare the set of sensors in fault obtained in 
step ,'), with the table of the EM B for each vari­
able: 
(a) If.)' = dJ there are no faults. 
(b) If 5' is equal to the EMB of a variable X, and 
there is no other EMB which is a subset of 
s·, then there is a single real fault in X. 
(c) If .5' is equal to the EMB of a variable X, 
and there are one or more EM B which are 
subsets of .':J', then there is a real fault in X, 
and possibly, real faults in the sensors whose 
EM B are subsets of .)'. 
(d) If S is equal to the union of several EMB and 
all these are disjoint, there are multiple real 
faults in all the sensors whose EM B are in S. 
(e) If none of the above cases is satisfied, then 
there are multiple faults but they can not be 
distinguished. All the sensors whose EMB 
are subsets of S could have a real fault. 
Notice t h at the propagation on the lattice is an index­
ing of a, table, i . e . ,  no e<tlc.ulations art' rE>quired . This is 
a very important feature for a system running in real 
tirne.  
The next. section explains the algorithm proposed in 
a real example ,  taken from a t.h�rmoelectrical power 
plant . 
5 SENS O R  VALIDATION IN A 
P OWER PLANT 
In order to dernonstrate t h e  ideas contained in th is 
article,  a rnodule of a combined cy cle power plant was 
chosen:  the gas tur b ine .  F igure 5 shows a simplified 
schernat ic dia.grarn of the type of gas turbines at the 
Dos Bo('as and Gomu Pala cio power plants in Mexico. 
., R co mpressor �, entrance 1 !urbine , 
I 
oJ 
air co ntro I 
1 ;  r r i ;  -..L.i-----.1.-L-c 
combustion 
chamber 
-- - __ _,_ --r-
fuel  valve I 
\ �:::-==:=-J 
l generator i 
! 
F igure 5 :  Sirn plifiecl schemat ic  diagram of a gas tur­
b ine. 
A g<ts turbine  consists fundamentally of four main 
parts: the com pressor , the combustion chamber,  the 
turbin<" i tself and tlw generator . The corn pressor feeds 
air to t he combustion chamber , wheff� the gas is also 
fed . H ere, the cornhustion produ ces h igh pressure 
gases at h igh tern Jwratun'_ The expansion of these 
ga�es in tllP tur b inP producPs t llP turbine rotation with 
� t.orq ue t hat is transrni ttf'd to the generator in order 
to prod uce the dert. r i r  p ower outp u t .  The air is rf'g­
ulat.ed by means of the mlet gu zde v a n e s  ( I < � V )  of the 
comp ressor , an d a contro l valve docs the same for the 
g a.'> fuel in tlw combustion charnber. The control valve 
is cotnrnanded by the control system or by the oper­
ator in the rnanua.l operation mode, and its apert ure 
ran be read by a posit ion sensor. The temperature at 
the blade path . which i s  the rnost cr it i cal variable. is 
taken along tlw c ircumference of the turbine.  
Among all var iab le:s t h at participate in the gas tur­
b ine, only a few are directly 1neasured by the sensors. 
Since the b lade path temperature is the most crit ical 
variable.  i t  is obtain<'cl t hro ugh sixteen thermocouple 
sensors locat.Pcl all around the t.urb iw' . From these 
sixteen , three �ets of averages arc taken by an alog cir­
cui try. These values are then averaged in order to 
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Figure 6 :  Model of the gas turb ine example.  
obtain a single value for the temperature .  The op� 
erator is informed of the average temperature, which 
is also used by a control strategy to protect the en­
gine. Table :3 shows the list. of variables of the model 
of Fig . 6 inc.luding the explanation of the process 
variable, their name, and their corresponding Markov 
blankets . From Table :3 , i t  is easy to see t hat th e l at-
Table 3: Variables in the example. 
process variable 
Selected b lade path tern p .  T 
B lade path tem p . avg .  1 t 1 
Blade path temp.  avg. � t�  
Blade path tem p .  avg. :3 t :3 
Flow of gas f 1 
Flow of air f2 
G as fuel pressure supply ps 
Real fuel valve posit ion pr 
Real I G V  p osition pa 
Position demand fuel valve dp 
Position demand I G V 's da 
M arkov b l anket 
{t 1 , t 2 , t :3} 
{T, t2 , t:3 , j 1 , /2} 
{T, t 1 ,  t:3 ,  /1,  /2 } 
{T, t l ,  t2 , / 1 ,  !2} 
{ t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , ps , pr} 
{ t 1, t2 , t :3 , pa }  
{! 1 } 
{! 1 , dp} 
{!2 , da} 
{pr} 
{pa} 
tice no des for variables t l ,  t2 ,  and t : )  is  exactly the 
same , i . e . ,  {T, t 1 , t2 , t :l , f l , f� } .  Hence according to 
section 4 ,  failures amongst. these sensors can not be 
distinguished by the system . 
In this examp le , if the node { t l , t2 , t :l , ps. pr }  is ob­
tained in the propagation on the \attire, according to 
Table 3, the fault is undoub tedly in the sensor mea­
suring the variable f l or flow of gas . Contrary to the 
examp le of Fig I which is very simple, this examp le 
allows the case of multiple faults also to be show n .  
S u p pose that. the sensor of the real fuel valve p osi­
tion (pr ) fails together with the sensor of the p os i­
tion dernand of I G Vs ( da ) .  The l attice node of pr 
is { f l , pr, dp} , and the da node is {pa , da } .  Conse­
quently, t he lattice node of the comb ined failure of 
pr and da is the union of their correspo n ding lattice 
nodes, i .e . ,  {f  l ,  pr, pa ,  dp, da } .  Finally, if there exists 
a fault in sensor dp and sensor p1· , the resu lt ing union 
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between both ('X t('nded M arkov b lanketo> io> given by 
{f 1 , dp, pr } w lt i r:h i� exactly the same as thP lat. t ir:e 
node uf ]11' _ In t.his c.a.sP ,  the model can only ensurE' 
th at there exi :-;t:-; a fau l t  in pr but it  can not distin­
guish the duuhlt' fau l t in pt and dp. 
6 CON CLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
WORK 
Thi� papPr h as p rP�Pnted an ap pro ac h to detect ing in­
con::;ist.Pnc iPs in tlw readings of sensors in i n d ustrial 
p lant s .  This ap p roac h .  b ased on Bayesian networks 
and constraint satisfaction , p ossPsses also tlw advan­
tage that much of the p rocessing IS performed off l ine.  
i .e .  before the system op erate� in th e  plant .  This 
characteris t i c  w il l  hel p in the real  time perform ancE' re­
ttuired in nwst uf t.he  industrial ap pl ications. With the 
use of p rohah i li ty propagat ion , a prediction is 1n ade of 
a variable's val ue b ased on other pararnf'ters . [f th is 
predi cated V<due dt:>v i <Lt.Ps front the actual value gi ven 
by a sensor , by s o l l l t' p rPdefiued rnargin ,  then s o m <-'  
fau lt can lw assumed . This fault detect ion rned1anism 
can only trdl if a sPnsor has a pot ential fau l t, bu t it 
can not tPll if t lw faul t  is real or ap parent . A t lw­
ory and algorithm wPre developed for distingmshmg 
real an d app arent. fau l ts , considering that one or nwre 
sensors can fai l  at the sante t ime.  For this.  the struc­
ture of t lw nwdt:>l i s  consi d erPd , which produ ces a set 
of constramts th at. h as to he solved to df'terrnine the 
faulty sensor( s ) . Tlw app roach is based on two IPv­
els: ( i )  p robabil i ty propagation , to detect a potent i a l 
fault , and ( i t )  run:> t t·a.iut managenwnt. to distinguish 
tht:> real fanlts front dw a p p arPnt ont:>s.  The uwt hod 
was ap p liPd to a s i t u p lifi,..cl rnodPI of a gas tur lHn<-' 
The maiu l i l l l itatiuu uf t h e  p ro p osed algor itluu is t hat 
in so m P  ca:><-'S . i t  i::< nut poss ib le to id ('nt ify p rel' isPiy tht· 
real faul t  ;uuung all  the senwr:> with pot('ntial fau l ts . 
Tht:> c ases w lwn no <-'X<-txt answer is p rov ided ar<-' suru­
marizecl as follows: 
• two or 1 1 1 0 1'<-' sPnsors with the same EM B ,  
• a don h i e  fau l t  IV lwr<-' onp E M  B i s  a su bset o f  t. lw 
otlwr.  
• mtdtip iP  f<lu l ts in w h i ch somP of t lw EM B fa.l l m 
t lw p re v i ous cases. 
For exam ple,  in F ig .  6, vari ablPs t 1 .  t '2 ,  and t :3 fall Pll 
t h e  firs t. ca�<-'- In F i g .  I there is an exarn p le of the 
second < ast� . The E M B  of p is {m . p }  and the m 's 
E M B  is {m . p. t} HPr<-', if m an d p fai l at t lw same 
time ,  this ntt:>chanisrn can o n l y  infonn that 111 fai!PCI 
but it  can not. tdl  if p failed or not . 
In order t.u bP app l ied in a real p lant. , the t.Pchnique 
rnust address ad e l i  tiona!  issues. 
First , thP techn iques descrilwd in t his papPr work well 
w hPn thP sPnsor fails cat.astrophirally .  H owPwr . a rt:>al 
prob l('m fac('d by t. lw npPrat.ors in  p ow('r pl ants ts slo w 
failurPs ,.; u c h  a,.; d<-'cal ihrat.ion .  D iffPrent proba b i l istic  
mechanisms have to be incluclecl in order to dPtect 
such slow deviations, for example. temporal reason­
ing . Then , the utilization of tPmporal probabilisti c  
reason ing is required a t  t lw lowt:>r lt:>vd o f  clPcision . 
The use of a p robabilistic temporal reasoning mecha­
nism , bes ides the slow failures rnent.ioned above , will 
also help to fonts on the clynarnic characterist i cs of the 
rno dels in a power plant. Since the p rocess of p ower 
gFnt:>ration has diffPrent p h  asPs, ( e .g . ,  start up, sy n­
chronization , stt:>ady st ate , and stop) different proba­
bil ist ic rnoclels are required . For exarnple ,  d ur ing the 
startu p phase, the ve lo c ity of the turb ine is t h e  vari­
able that. will  be subst it u t ed by the M egawatts gen­
erated during other phases. A mech anism that al lows 
changes in the probabilistic rnodel is required . 
[n add ition to the two levels of dP cision , a new level of 
rt:>asoning is requirPd to det.Pct w hen tllf' fault is in tlw 
process ,  and not in the readings of the i nst.rmnent.s . 
For examp l e , thP sensor valid at.or may detect an er­
roneous read ing frorn the turbine ve loc ity given the 
temperature and prt:>ssure rneasures . H owever,  i t  may 
be the case that th Pre is a SPrious rnechanical prob­
lem with the generator which may c ause that the real 
velocity to go to a very low val u e .  
Finally, the last stf'p i n  t h e  projec t w i l l  be the con­
struction of a prototype w hich performs in a thermo­
electri cal power plant .  This prototyp e requires a real 
time response. For this reason, d ifferent mechanisms 
of schedu l ing h ave to be deve loped , e.g . .  any t zme al­
gorithrns [Ibargiiengoytia d al. , 1 99.'i] .  
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